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Indemnity in California: Is it Really
Equitable After American Motorcycle
and Section 877.6?
The 1975 California Supreme Court decision in Li v. Yellow Cab,

represented a major shift from the then existing principles of joint
tort liability in California. Although the Li decision was aimed at
eliminating the harshness of contributory negligence by adopting com-

parative fault, 2 the decision also spawned new thought in the area
of contribution and indemnity. 3 In American Motorcycle Association

v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court sought to modify'
the principles of equitable indemnity to bring them into line with the

comparative fault principles adopted in Li.5 The decision in American
Motorcycle provided for indemnity among multiple defendants according to their' proportionate fault, 6 a major departure from the "all-

or-nothing" approach to total indemnity that existed previously in
California.7 In addition, the court suggested that the settlement release
provisions that existed in California8 be modified to allow a defendant who settles in good faith to be released from any claims for

partial indemnity based on comparative fault. 9 Two years after the
1. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). See infra notes 72-80 and
accompanying text.
2. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810, 532 P.2d. 1226, 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 862 (1975).
3. See Adams, Settlements After Li: But is it "Fair?," 10 PAC. L.J. 729, 729 (1979);
see also Comment, Loss Sharing Among Contract Defendants: English Parts For American
Motorcycle, 12 PAC. L.J. 893, 898 (1981).
4. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182, 192, 578 P.2d 899, 907 (1978).
5. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
6. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
7. Id. The California Supreme Court recognized that the all-or-nothing character of total
indemnity was the same deficiency suffered by the "discarded contributory negligence doctrine" and fell short of "fulfilling Li's goal." Id. See San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d
127, 130, 330 P.2d 802, 804 (1958); Peters v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d
419, 431, 260 P.2d 55, 62 (1953) (examples of the operation of total indemnity prior to Li).
8. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877. Section 877 provides:
[W]here a release, dismissal, with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue
is given in good faith before a judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors
claimed to be liable for the same tort.
(b) it shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for any
contribution from any other tortfeasors.
Id.
9.

American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 199, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
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decision in American Motorcycle, the California Legislature enacted
section 877.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, providing
for a pretrial hearing on the issue of the good faith settlement, and

expressly providing for a release from partial indemnity based upon
comparative fault once good faith is established."0

Although both American Motorcycle and section 877.6 brought
change to the existing system of equitable indemnity in California,
neither dealt specifically with the continuing vitality of the traditional
total indemnity" that had existed in California prior to American
Motorcycle. The language of the American Motorcycle opinion raises

the question of whether or not total indemnity survives the decision
in situations in which justice requires shifting the burden of the entire judgment to the party whose act caused the damage or injury
to the plaintiff. 2 This issue arises most frequently in cases in which
a tortfeasor brings an action for total indemnity against a cotortfeasor
who has entered into a good faith settlement under section 877.6.11
Section 877.6 expressly permits a release from all claims for comparative contribution or partial indemnity based on comparative fault,
upon determination of good faith settlement.

4

Section 877.6 does not

provide for a release from claims for total indemnity.' 5
Recent cases have recognized that the viability of a total indemnity
claim following a good faith settlement is an issue left unanswered
both by the California Supreme Court and the California Legislature.' 6

10. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6. see infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text. American Motorcycle modified the existing principles of total indemnity to provide for indemnity based upon comparative fault.
With the adoption of partial indemnity, a defendant could obtain indemnity from a cotortfeasor without having to prove that justice demanded a shift of the entire judgment to one
party. This approach was a major departure from the "all-or-nothing" approach of total indemnity. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
12. See infra notes 105-229 and accompanying text. See also E.L. White v. City of Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 375, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879, 885 (1982); Standard Pacific
v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 582, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 580, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 107; Angelus
Associates Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 542, 213 Cal. Rptr.
403, 407 (1985); Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 510, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825,
830 (1984); Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47, 50 (1984).
Some courts, however, have discussed the issue of the existence of total indemnity without
regard to the settlement provisions of § 877.6. See Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App.
3d 323, 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1983); City of Sacramento v. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App.
3d 869, 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767 (1981).
14. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 877.6.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 582, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 108; Angelus,
167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 407 (1985); Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 542,
203 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (1984).
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Attempts at resolving the issue at the appellate level have resulted

in decisions finding that total indemnity was replaced by the partial
indemnity of American Motorcycle,17 thus barring any claim for total
indemnity regardless of whether or not a cotortfeasor has entered into a good faith settlement under section 877.6.8 Others find that total

indemnity still is appropriate in cases in which liability is vicarious
or derivative.' 9 Those cases that allow a claim for total indemnity
reason that the precise language of section 877.6 does not bar a total

indemnity claim, even after a good faith settlement.20

This comment will examine whether total indemnity should exist

in California in spite of the "modifications" made by American Motorcycle and the release provisions of section 877.6. In analyzing this
controversy, an examination will be made of the history of California tort law governing liability among joint tortfeasors prior to the
Li decision. 2 ' In addition, this comment will review the decision of22
law.
Li v. Yellow Cab and the resulting changes in California tort
American Motorcycle will then be examined, with particular consideraliability. 21
tion of the effect of this decision on California joint tort
This comment also will review the legislation affecting contribution
and indemnity. 24 With this foundation, the case law subsequent to

American Motorcycle will be discussed.25 These cases will reveal that

the issue of the existence of total indemnity has been framed from

two perspectives. Some of the cases have focused only on the American
Motorcycle decision. 26 These cases have struggled with the question

of whether American Motorcycle abolished total indemnity in Califor-

17. See infra notes 119-73 and accompanying text. See Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App.
3d at 587, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 111; Kohn, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83;
Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
18. See infra notes 119-73 and accompanying text; see Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App.
3d at 587, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
19. An example of a person held vicariously liable would be a principle held liable for
the tortious conduct of an agent. An example of a person held derivatively liable would be
a retailer held liable for the defective product of the manufacturer. See infra notes 174-229
and accompanying text. See Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 407; Torres,
157 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 830; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 50 (1984).
20. See Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 407; Huizar, 156 Cal. App.
3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 50; White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
21. See infra notes 39-75 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 119-229 and accompanying text.
26. See Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769; Kohn, 142 Cal. App.
3d at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83; White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
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nia." Other cases have focused on section 877.6.28 These cases have

struggled with the question of whether or not a claim for total indemnity may be brought against a settling tortfeasor despite the release
provisions of section 877.6.29 An examination of the reasoning and
analysis of these cases will reveal the necessity of the continued existence of total indemnity in California in instances in which the liability
of a defendant is vicarious or derivative, despite the existence of a
good faith settlement under section 877.6.30 Initially, this comment
will explore the state of current law in order to understand the sources
of the controversy.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW

An example of a situation in which contribution and indemnity may

arise is an auto collision in which the negligient acts of two or more
tortfeasors combine to produce injury to the plaintiff. If a suit is
brought by the plaintiff against the two negligent tortfeasors, the fault
of the plaintiff and the defendants will be assessed under comparative
fault and the judgment will be reduced by a proportionate amount
equal to a percentage of the total damages attributable to the fault
of the plaintiff.3 Each defendant may be liable to the plaintiff for
the balance of the judgment under joint and several liability.32 Any
defendant who pays an amount greater than the fault assessed to that
defendant is entitled to reimbursement from cotortfeasors. This reimbursement may be in the form either of contribution or indemnity.
Contribution may be obtained only from codefendants," each paying an equal share of the judgment.3 ' Indemnity, however, may be
obtained from any tortfeasor, whether or not joined as a defendant
by the plaintiff.35 Prior to American Motorcycle, indemnity could be
27. Gemsch, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769; Kohn, 142 Cal. App. 3d
at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83; White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
28. Lopez, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 193; Standard Pacific, 176 Cal.
App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113; Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr.
at 407; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
29. Lopez, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 193; Standard Pacific, 176 Cal.
App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113; Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr.
at 407; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
30. See infra notes 244-58 and accompanying text.
31. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 874 (1975).
32. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 414 (1932).
33. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875.
34. Id.
35. Id. Although § 875 limited the right of contribution to defendants, the statute expressly left unaffected the already existing right of indemnity. Id.
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obtained only if the tortfeasor seeking indemnity had a right of

reimbursement 6 for all damages paid. An example of this right of
full reimbursement arose in cases in which a principal sought reimbursement from an agent for liability assessed to the principal under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. This right of full reimbursement
is referred to as total indemnity. After American Motorcycle, however,

partial indemnity, which allowed indemnity based on comparative fault,
may be obtained from a cotortfeasor. 37 In addition, a tortfeasor may
settle in good faith with the plaintiff and obtain a release from further claims for contribution or partial indemnity brought by other

tortfeasors.3 s

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

OF CALIFORNIA JOINT TORT LIABILITY

Though current law provides a means of reimbursement for the
defendant forced to pay a disproportionate share of the judgment,
reibursement was not always available in California. Until 1957,
California applied the common law view of joint tort liability.3 9 Under
the common law view, the rights and liabilities of a defendant in a
multiple defendant action were governed by the application of two
principles. First, all defendants in a multiple defendant action were
subject to joint and several liability. 0 Second, the defendants had
no right of contribution among each other." The courts refused to
allow contribution in these instances because all of the tortfeasors
were wrongdoers." 2
KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 51 (5th ed. 1984).
37. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 595, 578 P.2d 899,
910, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 193 (1978).
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6.
39. See, e.g., Thornton v. Luce, 209 Cal. App. 3d 542, 550, 26 Cal. Rptr. 393, 398 (1962);
see Comment, Contribution and Indemnity Collide with ComparativeNegligence The New Doctrine of Equitable Indemnity, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 779, 780 (1978).
40. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 414. Joint and several liability historically was limited
to cases in which defendants were said to have acted in concert, each sharing a common purpose. In these cases, a plaintiff had only one cause of action for injury. Thus the plaintiff
was entitled to judgment only once, whether one or all of the tortfeasors were joined as defendants. Id. Joinder of defendants as joint tortfeasors was limited at common law to situations
in which each acted in concert with the other defendants to produce a single injury to the
plaintiff. Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613); Adams v. White
Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 712, 195 P. 389, 391 (1921). The traditional common law definition
of joint tortfeasor has since expanded to include those whose conduct combines to produce
an injury whether acting jointly or in succession. All joint tortfeasors under this expanded
definition are subject to joint and several liability. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
§ 252 (1974). See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 36, § 51.
41. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); Thornton,
209 Cal. App. 2d at 550, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
42. See, e.g., Dow v. Sunset Telephone & Telegraph Co., 162 Cal. 136, 138, 121 P. 379,

36. W. PROSSER & W.
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As a result of the operation of these principles, the plaintiff could

43
dictate the fate of any tortfeasor potentially liable for the judgment.
The plaintiff could do this by choosing to sue the tortfeasors most
able to satisfy the judgment without considering the respective fault

of the parties involved in causing the injury. 4 The burden of the
judgment was borne only by the defendants chosen by the plaintiff,
despite the existence of other tortfeasors not joined in the action.
In 1957, the California Legislature mitigated some of the harsh
results produced by these common law principles. 4

The legislature

enacted sections 875 through 877 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 6 The effect of these additions was twofold. First, the common law principle that barred contribution among multiple defendants was abandoned in favor of a new provision allowing contribution among joint tortfeasor defendants. 7 Section 875 provides for
a right of contribution in instances when one defendant has satisfied
the judgment in total or has paid more than the required pro rata
share. 8 In these instances, however, the right of contribution is limited
to contribution from other tortfeasors joined by the plaintiff as defendants.4 9 The statute further assumes equal fault among defendants,
allowing only pro rata contribution. 50 Second, section 877 abandoned the common law release provisions that provided that a release
of one tortfeasor acted to release all tortfeasors5" from liability. 2 Sec-

380 (1912); see also River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993
n.5, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 n.5 (1972).
43. Adams, supra note 3, at 734; see also Comment, supra note 39, at 781.
44. Adams, supra note 3, at 734.
45. CA. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-877.
46. These statutes are often collectively referred to as the Contribution Statute. See, e.g.,
Molinari, Tort Indemnity in California, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 159, 161 (1968).
47. Code of Civil Procedure § 875:
(a) Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort action, there shall be a right of contribution among them as hereinafter
provided.
(b) Such a right shall be administered in accordance with the principles of equity.
(c) Such a right of contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor has,
by-payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than his pro rata share
thereof. It shall be so limited to the excess so paid over the pro rata share of the
person so paying and in no event shall any tortfeasor be compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire judgment.
CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 875.
48. CA. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 875(c).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. At common law, the operation of a release on all tortfeasors was based upon the
recognition that the plaintiff had only one cause of action against all tortfeasors, which was
surrendered by releasing one from liability. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 36, § 49.
52. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 877(a).
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tion 877 provides that a release discharges from liability only the defen-

dant to whom the release was given.5 3 Section 877 provides that a

release of a defendant also discharges that defendant from any fur-

'
ther claims by the other defendant tortfeasors for contribution.5 The

judgment against the other defendant tortfeasors is reduced by the
amount stipulated in 55the release or by the amount of consideration

paid for the release.
Although the enactment of sections 875 through 877 reduced some
of the harshness of the common law treatment of joint tortfeasors,

the plaintiff still has the ability to dictate the exercise of this new
right of contribution.5 6 A plaintiff still can choose to sue those best

able to satisfy the judgment or those most vulnerable to suit. Joint
and several liability was retained expressly so that one defendant still
could be forced to satisfy the entire judgment.1 7 The right of contribution exists only against those joined as defendants in the original
action.5 8 Further, each defendant is liable only for a pro rata share

of the judgment.5 9 Potentially, a less culpable defendant could be forced to pay a share of the judgment equal to that of a more culpable

defendant. 6 °
The only remedy available to a defendant against a tortfeasor not
joined in the action by the plaintiff is to join that party in a third
party claim for indemnity or bring an indemnity claim in a separate
action. 6' The concept of indemnity remained unaffected by the 1957
Id.
Id. See supra note 8 for the statutory release provisions of § 877.
55. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 877(a).
56. See Adams, supra, note 3, at 734. See also Comment, Contribution and Indemnity,
57 CALiF. L. REv. 490, 513 (1969), arguing for extension of the principles of indemnity to
provide allocation of the judgment among all tortfeasors whether or not joined as parties.
This extension would allow the burden of damages to be spread among all culpable parties,
not just those joined as defendants by the plaintiff. Id. American Motorcycle provided substantially what the comment advocated. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20
Cal. 3d 578, 604, 578 P.2d 899, 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 198 (1978).
57. California Code of Civil Procedure § 875(g) provides: "This title shall not impair the
right of a plaintiff to satisfy a judgment in full as against any tortfeasor judgment debtor."
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 875(g).
58. California Code of Civil Procedure § 875(a) provides: "Where a money judgment has
been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort action, there shall be a right
of contribution among them." CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 875(a).
59. See supra, note 34 (text of California Code of Civil Procedure § 875). Pro rata division of the judgment amounts to equal shares among all defendants. See CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 875.
60. See Comment, supra note 3, at 896 (suggesting that the statutory contribution provisions provide an equal, though perhaps not equitable sharing of liability).
61. Id. The right of contribution provided by § 875 is limited to those parties joined as
defendants. Contribution does not extend to tortfeasors not joined as defendants by the plaintiff. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875.
53.
54.
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additions to the Code of Civil Procedure.62 Since indemnity, however,

was an "all-or-nothing" principle which required the entire burden
of the judgment to be shifted to one party, despite a judgment against
the party bringing the claim for indemnity,63 only a few situations
were recognized as proper cases for total indemnity."
In an effort to simplify the application of common law indemnity,
California courts began distinguishing defendants as primarily or secondarily liable or as actively or passively negligent.6 5 In theory, the right

of indemnity was available only to the passively or secondarily negligent
defendant against an actively or primarily negligent defendant. 66 The
California courts, however, were inconsistent in both the choice of
labels and the meaning that was applied to these labels, adding to
the difficulty of exercising the right of indemnity. 67 A few courts stress-

ed that the key to proper application of these terms was in understanding that the purpose of the terms was not to assess the respective
degrees of negligence of tortfeasors, but to identify different types
of negligence by tortfeasors. 6s Thus, a secondarily negligent tortfeasor,
one to whom a right of indemnity was traditionally available, was
a party to whom liability was imputed either by statute or through

some common law mechanism. 69 The passively or secondarily negligent
defendant was thus held-liable for the negligence of the party whose

act resulted in injury to the plaintiff.7 0 Secondary negligence occurs

most often in situations in which liability is based on the doctrine
62. Comment, supra note 39, at 783.
63. See American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 595, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
The court suggested that total indemnity, the shifting of the entire burden to one tortfeasor,
does not provide the just result in a "great majority" of situations. Id.
64. See Comment, supra note 56, at 505.
65. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. State ex rel. Department of Public Works, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 918, 923, 108 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545 (1973); Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal.
App. 2d 367, 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 307 (1962); see Comment, supra note 39, at 783. Initially,
the right of indemnity required some legal relationship, such as a contract. The right today
is recognized in favor of an innocent defendant against a culpable tortfeasor. These active/passive,
primary/secondary distinctions were an effort to recognize these situations. Id.
66. See Comment, supra note 56, at 508 (suggesting that California courts used the primary
versus secondary distinction in noncontractual implied indemnity cases and used the active versus passive distinction in implied contractual indemnity cases); but see Comment, supra note
39, at 783 (suggesting that the cases do not indicate that a consensus was reached by the California
courts on the proper application of the distinctions). Compare City of San Francisco v. Ho
Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958) with Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App.
2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962).
67. Comment, supra note 39, at 783.
68. American Can Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525,
21 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (1962) (citing Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (Pa. 1951)).
69. American Can, 202 Cal. App. 2d at 525, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
70. Id; see also Molinari, supra note 46, at 163 (quoting Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe,
77 A.2d 368, 370 (Pa. 1951)).
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of respondeat superior 7' or in products liability actions when a dealer
or retailer, though not guilty of producing the injury-causing defect,
is nonetheless held liable for a defect that was caused by the manufacturer. 72 A secondarily negligent defendant thus did not act to cause
injury to the plaintiff. The primarily or actively negligent defendant,
on the other hand, was one who did act to cause the injury to the
plaintiff.
Unlike the right of contribution, the right of a tortfeasor to indemnity has never been dependent on the choice of defendants sued
by the plaintiff. A tortfeasor may pursue a claim for indemnity against
a cotortfeasor not joined by the plaintiff in the original action. Prior
to American Motorcycle, however, the right of indemnity was
unavailable in a majority of situations, 7 because in most cases, the
liability of the defendant was based on active fault. In these cases,
equity did not demand that all liability be shifted to another party.
Further, even when available, the application of indemnity was a source
of great confusion for the courts.7 ' Thus, though indemnity allowed
the tortfeasor the ability to bring an action against any tortfeasor,
not limited to those tortfeasors joined by the plaintiff as defendants,
indemnity was unavailable to the majority of tortfeasors. The
tortfeasor-defendant could exercise a right of contribution with much
greater ease, but was able to receive only a pro rata share of the
judgment from each of the tortfeasors joined as parties against whom
a judgment had been rendered.
Thus, California courts did not allocate fault among joint tortfeasors
not joined by the plaintiff as defendants. The reluctance to allocate
fault among joint tortfeasors was abandoned by the Supreme Court
holding in American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court.7 The
Supreme Court, however, did not recognize this fault allocation between tortfeasors until after the court recognized fault allocation between a plaintiff and a defendant. This fault allocation between a
plaintiff and a defendant was first recognized in the much celebrated
case of Li v. Yellow Cab.

71.

See Comment, supra note 56, at 495.

72.
73.

Id.
See American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 595, 578 P.2d at 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193.

The California Supreme Court recognized that the "great majority" of cases do not require
"the imposition of the entire loss upon one or another tortfeasor." Id.
74. Id. at 594, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193; Atchison, T. & S. Fe R.R. v.
LanFranco, 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 886, 73 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (1968).
75. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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Li v.

YELLOW

CAB: AN ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT FAIRNESS

In 1975, the California Supreme Court decided Li v. Yellow Cab,7 6
which established comparative negligence in California." In deciding
Li, the court abandoned the principle of contributory negligence that
previously had acted as a bar to recovery by plaintiffs found responsible for acts contributing in any degree to their own injury.7 8 Though
the intent of Li was merely to mitigate harshness toward plaintiffs
by the operation of contributory negligence, the case has had great
effect on California law governing joint tort liablity."1
In Li, the plaintiff and the defendant were involved in an automobile
accident at an intersection.8 ° Both the plaintiff and the defendant were
found negligent by the trial court.8 ' The trial court found that the
negligence of the plaintiff, a proximate cause of the injury, barred
any recovery under the principles of contributory negligence.82 The
supreme court, however, adopted a system of "pure" comparative
negligence8 3 in which liability is assessed in proportion to the respec84
tive fault of each of the parties.
The comparative fault standard adopted by the supreme court in
Li requires that the fault of both plaintiff and defendant parties be
determined as a fraction of the total cause of the injury.8S Though
the intent of the standard was to provide a means of reducing the
recovery of the plaintiff according to fault without completely barring recovery, comparative fault principles also provide a means of
assessing the respective liabilities of multiple tortfeasor defendants.1 6
76. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
77. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 827, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
78. Id. at 808, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
79. Adams, supra note 3, at 729.
80. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 809, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 827, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874. The court adopted this "pure"
form of comparative negligence, which permits some recovery no matter how great the fault
of the plaintiff, expressly over the "50 percent" form. The "50 percent" form is one of the
two other principle systems of comparative fault employed presently in American jurisdictions.
Adams, supra note 3, at 735. This form, also called the "greater than" system, bars recovery
to the plaintiff if his fault be judged greater than the combined fault of the defendants. Tle
"less than" system bars recovery to the plaintiff unless his fault is less than the combined
total fault of the defendants. Id.
84. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
85. Id. at 808, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
86. Id. at 823, 532 P.2d at 1239, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871. Though the California Supreme
Court recognized the potential effect that the decision would have on the assessment of fault
among multiple defendants, especially in situations in which all responsible parties were not
brought before court, this effect was never discussed thoroughly. The court instead chose not
to address the effect on multiple parties because the issue was "not involved in the case" before
the court. Id. at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
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This means of determining the respective liabilities of multiple tortfeasors opened the door for modifications in the existing principles
of contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors in California. These
modifications to the existing principles of contribution and indemnity were made through the adoption of partial indemnity in American
Motorcycle.
AMERICAN MOTORCYCLE ASSOCIATION

V. SUPERIOR COURT:

BRINGING INDEMNITY IN LINE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF Li

In 1978, the California Supreme Court decided American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court. 7 In American Motorcycle, a

teenage boy was injured while participating in a novice cross-country
motorcycle race. The sponsoring organizations were joined as defendants in the suit. 8 American Motorcycle Association, one of these parties, sought leave to file a cross-complaint against the parents of the
boy alleging negligent supervision and seeking indemnity in the event
the association was found liable.8 9 The trial court denied the motion
for leave to file the cross-complaint and the appellate court affirmed.
The supreme court recognized that the traditional principles of contribution and indemnity were inconsistent with the principles of comparative fault adopted in Li."° Pro rata contribution 9 ' and "all-ornothing" 9 indemnity did not make sense when, in most instances,
the responsibility for the injury was neither shared equally by all parties nor was the iijury entirely the fault of one party. 93
In response to finding that neither contribution nor indemnity was
consistent with comparative fault, the court referred to the "logic,
practical experience and fundamental justice" upon which Li was
based9" and called for a modification of existing indemnity principles
to allow partial indemnity. 95 The court took notice of the difficulty
of applying the active versus passive, primary versus secondary distinc87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

20 Cal. 3d 578, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978).
Id. at 584, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.

Id.
Id. at 595, 578 P.2d at 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.

92. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
93.

American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.

Recognizing that neither contribution nor total indemnity was consistent with the principles
of comparative fault, the court stated: "[Tihe common goal of both doctrines, the equitable
distribution of loss among multiple tortfeasors, suggests a need for a reexamination of these
twin concepts." Id.
94.
95.

Id. at 595, 578 P.2d at 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
Id.
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tions previously used in evaluating indemnity claims and ultimately
rejected these distinctions as "artificial. ' 96 Further, the court found
that the all-or-nothing approach of total indemnity did not provide
a means for achieving a fair result in a "great majority" of cases.9"
In an attempt to provide a means for producing a fair result, the
court adopted a new system of partial indemnity based upon comparative fault. 9
The American Motorcycle court, however, did not expressly abandon total indemnity. The adoption of partial indemnity was the
response to the recognition that total indemnity simply was inapplicable
in the majority of cases in which each defendant was guilty of at
least some active fault.9 9 The partial indemnity adopted in American
Motorcycle is a means of providing indemnification among defendants whose fault precludes total indemnity. The few cases in which
total indemnity does have proper application presumably remain untouched by American Motorcycle.
In addition to the silence of American Motorcycle on the issue of
the existence of total indemnity, another important aspect of American
Motorcycle was the decision of the court not to reinterpret the statutory
rules of contribution in California.' 0 Although the respective liability of multiple defendants is not likely to be equal under comparative
fault principles, the supreme court did not suggest a modification of
these statutory contribution provisions. Thus, the court in American
Motorcycle modified indemnity in California, not because total indemnity was in greater need of alteration than contribution, but
because, as between the two, the court retained greater freedom to
change decisional law than to change statutory law.' 1
The court in American Motorcycle also dealt with the argument
that partial indemnity would defeat the settlement release provisions
of section 875102 of the Code of Civil Procedure.' 3 The court recog96. Id.
97. Id. at 594, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
98. Id. at 595, 578 P.2d at 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
99. Id. at 608, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
100. Miller, Extending the Fairness Principle of Li and American Motorcycle: Adoption
of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 PAC. L.J. 835, 847 (1981). The author suggests
that American Motorcycle circumvented the contribution statute. Id.
101. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 602, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
The California Supreme Court expressly left undecided the question of whether the same provisions in the statute which justified the modification of indemnity would permit the court to
interpret the statute as providing for comparative rather than per capita contribution. Id.
102. Id. at 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
103. Id. At the time American Motorcycle was decided, § 877 of the Code of Civil Pro-

cedure provided a release from claims for contribution. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.
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nized the importance of maintaining this protection, and reasoned
that the release provisions logically ought to extend to protect the
settling tortfeasor from partial indemnity as well as from contribution.' 0° The California Legislature reacted to this suggestion made by
the court by enacting section 877.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 877.6:
CODIFICATION OF AMERICAN MOTORCYCLE

A

In 1980, the California Legislature enacted section 877.6 of the Code
of Civil Procedure which codified that portion of American Motorcycle which provided a settling tortfeasor a release from claims for
partial indemnity.'0 5 Section 877.6 further compounded the issue of
the continued existence of total indemnity. The statute expressly provides that the settling tortfeasor is released from claims for "equitable
comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based
on comparative negligence or comparative fault."'0 1 6 Although section 877.6 bars claims for partial indemnity against a settling tort07
feasor, the statute does not expressly bar claims for total indemnity.
In point of fact, the statute was not intended to address the existence of total indemnity, but to provide for a pretrial hearing of
the issue of good faith in a settlement.' 0 8 Prior to the enactment of
section 877.6, no mechanism for determining good faith existed. 0 9
Thus, neither the express language nor the apparent intent of section
877.6 addresses the continued existence of total indemnity. With the
passage of section 877.6 in 1980, however, the issue of the status
of total indemnity in California was fully framed and began to apSeveral amicae argued that the incentives to settle provided by this section would be thwarted
if a settling tortfeasor were still vulnerable to future claims for partial indemnity. American
Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
104. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 603, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
105. See Angelus Associates Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d
532, 537, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 407 (1985).
106. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. "Rptr. at 200.
107. California Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6 provides:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint
tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith settlement
entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors.
(c) The determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other tortfeasor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor
for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity based
on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 877.6.
108. Id. See Review of Selected 1980 CaliforniaLegislation, 12 PAC. L.J. 290, 290 (1980).
109. Review of Selected 1980 California Legislation, 12 PAC. L.J. 290 (1980).
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pear in the courts of appeal."10 Though American Motorcycle modified
existing principles of indemnity to allow partial indemnity,"' confu-

sion arose in the lower courts, first regarding whether this modification was, in fact, an abolition of total indemnity,"12 and second, if
total indemnity did survive American Motorcycle, whether a claim
for total indemnity may be brought against a settling tortfeasor despite
section 877.6.111

In some decisions the courts have addressed these questions by focusing on the intent of section 877.6. Although section 877.6 does not

expressly provide a settling tortfeasor with a release from claims for
total indemnity, some appellate courts have concluded that the
'4

legislature intended also to provide settling tortfeasors with immunity
from total indemnity. Other courts, however, have limited the impact of section 877.6 to the express provisions of the statute, holding
that total indemnity is still available against a settling tortfeasor."15
In other decisions, the judicial intent of American Motorcycle has
been the point of focus." 6 Some courts have held that the intent of
American Motorcycle was to abolish total indemnity altogether."'

Other courts have reached the opposite result, reasoning that the principles of comparative fault, upon which American Motorcycle is based,
are inapplicable to the typical cases in which a claim for total indemnity is brought, namely, cases involving vicarious or derivative liabili8

ty."l

110. See infra notes 119-229 and accompanying text.
111. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
112. See Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1983);
E.L. White v. City of Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879,
885 (1982); City of Sacramento v. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764,
769 (1981).
113. See Angelus Associates v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 542,
213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 407 (1985); Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 542, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 47, 50 (1984); Lopez v. Blecher, 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. 190, 193 (1983).
114. See Standard Pacific v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 589, 222 Cal. Rptr.
106, 113 (1986).
115. See Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 407; Huizar, 156 Cal. App.
3d at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50; White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
116. See White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 885; Gemsch, 115 Cal. App.
3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
117. See Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 587, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 111; City of
Sacramento v. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768; Gemsch concedes
that American Motorcycle did not fully repudiate total indemnity, but contends that total indemnity has been restricted after American Motorcycle to cases in which total indemnity is
provided by contract. Id.
118. See Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 407; White, 138 Cal. App.
3d at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
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POST AMFRICAN MOTORCYCLE DECISIONS

The California Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether
or not total indemnity exists after American Motorcycle, nor has the
court addressed the issue of whether a claim for total indemnity
brought against a settling tortfeasor is consistent with the intent of
section 877.6. The court, however, expressly has left undecided the
question of whether comparative indemnity is even applicable to situations in which the liability of a defendant is vicarious or derivative."'
Some appellate courts have noted the express decision of the supreme
court to leave this issue open in support of the contention that total
indemnity still is available in appropriate instances, even against a
settling tortfeasor.' 2 0 Other courts have reasoned that total indemnity
has been greatly limited, if not abolished, by both American Motorcycle, and the subsequent enactment of section 877.6.121
A.

The Cases Against the Continued Existence of Total

Indemnity
In City of Sacramento v. Gemsch,'2 2 the city brought a claim for

total indemnity against a landowner after both were joined as defendants in a personal injury suit.' 3 The plaintiff in Gemsch suffered injuries in a fall on the sidewalk adjacent to the property of the landowner. The landowner, who had a statutory duty to keep the sidewalk
free from debris, settled with the plaintiff before trial.' 24 The city
attempted to base an indemnity claim on an implied contract between
the city and the landowner based on city code sections which imposed the duty on the landowner.' 25
The Gemsch court denied the claim brought by the city for total

indemnity.' 26 The court conceded' 27 that American Motorcycle did not

119. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 332, 579 P.2d 441, 446, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 550, 555.
120. See, e.g., Angelus Associates v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532,
537, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 406 (1985).
121. StandardPacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 593, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 115; Lopez v. Blecher,
143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. 190, 193 (1983); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal.
App. 3d 323, 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1983); City of Sacramento v. Gemsch, 115 Cal.
App. 3d 869, 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767 (1981); see infra notes 122-73 and accompanying text.
122. 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981).
123. Id. at 871, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
124.- Id.
125. 115 Cal. App. 3d at 873, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
126. Id. at 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769. "There is no equitable indemnity available to the
appellant because respondent's pre-trial settlement precludes it. There is no triable issue." Id.
127. 115 Cal. App. 3d at 875, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 767. The court conceded that claims for
express contractual indemnity were not governed by American Motorcycle. Id. at 877, 171 Cal.
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repudiate total indemnity expressly.' 28 The court concluded, however,
that the discussion of the active versus passive and primary versus
secondary distinctions in American Motorcycle left "little doubt" where
the supreme court stood on the issue of the continued practical existence of total indemnity. 29 On this basis, Gemsch limited the
availability of total indemnity to those situations in which a contract
or statute provided for indemnity.' 30 In all other situations, according to Gemsch, the right of indemnity is properly subject to the
"guidelines of American Motorcycle."' 3 ' Though Gemsch set forth
broad propositions rejecting the continued practical existence of total
indemnity, the court also found Sacramento guilty of affirmative, or
active negligence.' 3 2 On the basis of this type of fault, the city would
not have had a right of total indemnity if the case had occured prior
to American Motorcycle.'33 Therefore, the broad interpretations enunciated by Gemsch are properly seen as dicta. Thus, the case can be
viewed as a decision properly based upon pre-American Motorcycle
law and not inconsistent with the continued existence of total
indemnity.
The dissent in Gemsch, 34 however, argued that American Motorcycle merely modified, but did not abolish, traditional principles of
indemnity."' The dissent is based largely on the contention that if
the supreme court had intended to do away with total indemnity, that
intention would have been expressed more clearly in the language of
American Motorcycle.'36 Further, the dissent contended that American
Motorcycle did nothing to change the equitable considerations that
traditionally had been the basis of total indemnity. 37 According to
Rptr. at 770. The right of indemnity should follow the guidelines of American Motorcycle

unless a contract or statute provides otherwise. Id.
128. 115 Cal. App. 3d at 875, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
129. Id.
130. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
131. Id.
132. 115 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
133. California courts refused to allow indemnity between tortfeasors when each was guilty
of some affirmative act of negligence. Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367,
382, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 307 (1962).
134. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769.

135.
136.

Id.
Id. See Angelus Associates v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532,

542, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 409 (1985); E.L. White v. City of Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App.
3d 366, 375, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879, 885 (1982); see supra notes 175-86, 207-25 and accompanying

text.
137.

City of Sacramento v. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 879, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764, 769

(Paras, J., dissenting). The dissent stated: "Where one who has committed no wrongful act

is caused to incur liablity for the act of another, justice demands total indemnity. . . .I do
not read American Motorcycle as declaring otherwise; nor do I read its partial indemnity doctrine, with its ramifications, as achieving the same result." Id.
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the dissent, total indemnity is available, despite American Motorcycle
and section 877.6, to one "who has committed no wrongful act" 3but
8
is caused "to incur liability by the wrongful act of another."'1
Kohn v. Superior Court,'39 closely following Gemsch, also held that
a claim for total indemnity which was not based on express or implied contractual provisions was barred by American Motorcycle.' 0
In Kohn, a homebuyer brought suit against a real estate broker and
a construction company for fraud in failing to disclose structural
defects caused by a fire in the building.'' The real estate broker cross42
complained against the construction company for total indemnity.'
When the construction company settled with the plaintiff, the crosscomplaint was dismissed. 43 The court cited Gemsch in support of
the dismissal of the cross-complaint. '4 The court, however, also found
the real estate broker guilty of active negligence in causing the injury.1 45 Once again, the equitable principles that support total indemnity were not present in the case."'4 Thus, Kohn is not-necessarily
inconsistent with the view that total indemnity still exists despite the
provisions of American Motorcycle and section 877.6.
In 1983, a claim for indemnity brought by a defendant against a
settling tortfeasor was again denied in Lopez v.Blecher.'47 In Lopez,
a good samaritan who had stopped to render aid to passengers of
4
an overturned van was hit by a car that careened off of the van.' 1
The plaintiff-good samaritan brought suit against both the driver of
the car and the owner of the van.' 4 9 The van owner cross-complained
against the driver of the car for total indemnity, but the crosscomplaint was dismissed when a settlement was reached between the
driver and the good samaritan. s° In Lopez the court was most concerned with the policy of promoting settlement.' 5' Lopez relied on
138.
139.

Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 879, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983).

140. Id. at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83. The court in Kohn, following the reasoning in Gemsch,
dismissed the claim for total indemnity because of the absence of any assertions of contractual
indemnity rights. A good faith settlement having been reached, the court reasoned that all
forms of indemnity other than contractual were barred under § 877.6. Id.
141. Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 325, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78, 80 (1983).

142.

Id.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Kohn, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
Lopez v. Blecher, 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 192 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1983).
Id. at 738, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
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the language in American Motorcycle calling for the release of a settling tortfeasor from claims for partial indemnity."5 2 The Lopez court,
however, did not address the issue completely. Instead, the court held
that to allow a defendant to whom liability has been imputed to bring
a claim for partial indemnity would undermine the statutory policy
of section 877.6."' In failing to address the issue of whether total
indemnity claims may be brought against a settling tortfeasor," 4 Lopez
does nothing more than restate the express statutory provisions of
section 877.6.
The most recent case to find total indemnity unavailable after
American Motorcycle was StandardPacific of San Diego v. A.A. Baxter Corporation'5 decided in January 1986. In that case, a group of
homeowners brought suit against a development company and a soil
grading company for property damage caused by soil subsidence. The
soil grading company settled with the plaintiffs, and sought a dismissal,
based on the good faith settlement, of the claim for total indemnity
brought by the development company. 5 6 The trial court dismissed
the indemnity claim upon a determination that the settlements were
made in good faith.'"
The court of appeal first remanded the case on the ground that
the trial court used an improper standard in making a finding of good
faith.' 58 Standard Pacific addressed the issue of whether a claim for
total indemnity still was available against the settling tortfeasor after
a good faith settlement.' 59 In concluding that the claim was barred
after a good faith settlement, the court focused on three arguments.
The Standard Pacific court first reasoned that partial indemnity,
based on comparative fault, effectively had abrogated the need for
total indemnity after American Motorcycle. 60 The system of partial
indemnity, according to the court, already allowed a defendant who
was zero percent at fault to obtain full indemnity.' 6' According to
152. Lopez, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 739, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 192. (citing Amefican Motorcycle,
20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.)
153. 143 Cal. App. 3d at 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
154. In a later case, Angelus Associates v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., the court recognized
that Lopez did not even address the issue of a claim for total indemnity against a settling
tortfeasor. Angelus Associates v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 532, 542,
213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 407 (1985). See also infra notes 207-25 and accompanying text.
155. 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1986).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 242.
159. Id.
160. Id. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 595, 578 P.2d
899, 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 193 (1978).
161. Id.
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this argument, total indemnity is at one end of the spectrum of indemnity adopted in American Motorcycle.' 2 Although this argument
is logically sound, the court did not cite any cases in which partial
indemnity had been applied in this manner. Thus, though the argument is sound in theory, practical experience and prior case law do
not offer support for the conclusion that partial indemnity as adopted
by American Motorcycle subsumes traditional total indemnity.
The court next reasoned that section 877.6 takes into account the
defendant whose liability is vicarious or derivative by requiring that
all settlements be in good faith. 63 A good faith determination, according to the court, ought to consider the prospective liability of
all defendants, both settling and nonsettling.'" Again, this argument,
though sound, runs counter to prior California case law.
In 1985, the California Supreme Court, in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v.
Woodward-Clyde & Associates,'65 articulated the proper standard for
determining good faith under section 877.6.166 Tech-Bilt required that
the trial court inquire whether the amount of the settlement reasonably
reflects the proportional liability of the settling tortfeasor,'67 perhaps
impliedly necessitating some inquiry into the liability of the other
defendants. The court, however, diluted the strength of this standard
by requiring that the party asserting lack of good faith show that
the settlement amount was "so far out of the ballpark" '' 68 that the
settlement is inconsistent with the objectives of section 877.6. In other
words, Tech-Bilt articulates a heavy burden upon those asserting that
the settlement was not made in good faith. Furthermore, section 877.6
places the burden of proof on the party asserting a lack of good
faith.' 69 Thus, although Standard Pacific asserts that the respective
fault of the nonsettling defendants should be taken into account in
determining good faith, the heavy burden on the nonsettling defendant articulated in Tech-Bilt seems to make the practicality of inquiry
doubtful.
Finally, the court in Standard Pacific addressed the contention that
a vicariously liable defendant is not a "tortfeasor" within the mean162. Standard Pacific v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 587, 222 Cal. Rptr.
106, 111 (1986).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
166. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. California Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6(d) provides: "The party asserting the lack
of good faith shall have the burden of proof on the issue." CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 877.6(d).
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ing of section 877.6, and thus is not barred from bringing a claim
for total indemnity against a settling defendant.' 7 The court reasoned
that the trend toward broadening the term "joint tortfeasor" to include not only those defendants who acted in concert to cause injury, but also those defendants who acted jointly, concurrently, or
simultaneously,' 7 ' allows a vicariously liable defendant to be within
the broad meaning of "tortfeasor" in section 877.6.172 Although the
term "joint-tortfeasor" has been expanded to include all who act
to cause the same injury,' 71 the court suggested that the term should
be extended to include those innocent of any wrongdoing. Thus, though
Standard Pacific suggests that the defendant whose liability is vicarious
or derivative is adequately protected under partial indemnity as adopted
by American Motorcycle and section 877.6, the arguments are unconvincing and lack foundation in California case law.
B. The Cases in Support of the Continued Existence of Total
Indemnity
Though a number of cases have found that total indemnity has
been replaced by the partial indemnity principles of American Motorcycle or the enactment of section 877.6, an almost equal number have
reached the opposite result. 74 In E.L. White v. City of Huntington
Beach,' 7 a California appellate court addressed the issue of whether
total indemnity existed after American Motorcycle. In White, a
wrongful death action was brought by the representatives of an
employee of a subcontractor against the City of Huntington Beach
and a contractor hired by the city after the employee was killed when
a trench collapsed. Two of the chief construction inspectors of the
city were present at the site while the employee was working and noted
the unsafe condition, but did nothing to correct the hazard. The contractor brought an action for total indemnity against the city.' 76 The
city argued that total indemnity had been abandoned by American
170. Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
171. See Schwartz, supra note 40, § 252.
172. Id.
173. Comment, supra note 39, at 780.
174. See Angelus Associates v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 542,
213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 407 (1985); Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 511, 203
Cal. Rptr. 825, 833 (1984); Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 542, 203 Cal. Rptr.
47, 50 (1984); Turcon v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 284, 188 Cal. Rptr.
580, 583 (1983); E.L. White v. City of Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 376, 187

Cal. Rptr. 879, 885 (1982); see supra notes 175-225 and accompanying text.
175.
176.

138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1982).
While, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 374, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
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Motorcycle.'" The court cited the holding of American Motorcycle
recognizing that the decision sought to modify the all-or-nothing

equitable indemnity to allow partial indemnity in appropriate cases.'

8

The court in White reasoned that comparative negligence principles
were intended to apportion fault and are applicable only to those
defendants who share responsiblity for causing the injury. 79 This

category of defendants would not include those defendants who are
free from any active fault, specifically those defendants whose liabili-

ty is vicarious or derivative. The liability of these defendants is based
not on fault but on public policy that requires that they be liable
to the plaintiff for the acts of others. 8 ' The White court reasoned
that since the partial indemnity of American Motorcycle is based on
apportionment of fault principles, partial indemnity is not applicable
to defendants who are liable as a result of public policy and not as
a result of any shared active fault. 8'
White, however, did not discuss the validity of a claim for total
indemnity brought against a settling tortfeasor under section 877.6.
Later cases dealing with this issue do cite White for the proposition
that partial indemnity based on comparative fault is inapplicable in
instances of vicarious or derivative liability. " The later cases follow
the reasoning of White, which suggests that vicarious or derivative
liability does not fit within the framework of comparative fault principles. 83 According to this reasoning partial indemnity, based on comparative fault principles, is also inapplicable in cases in which the
liability of a defendant is vicarious or derivative.' 84 Section 877.6,
177. Id. at 375, 187 Cal. Rptr. 885.
178. Id. at 375, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885. The White court further found that the supreme
court in American Motorcycle relied on a New York appellate court case in modifying the
equitable indemnity doctrine. Id. (citing Dole v. Dow Chemical, 282 N.E.3d 288 (N.Y. 1972)).
That portion of the Dole opinion cited in American Motorcycle states: "There are situations
when the facts would in fairness warrant what [named defendant] here seeks-passing on to
[a concurrent tortfeasor] all responsibility for negligence, a traditional full indemnification."
American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 597, 578 P.2d at 911, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 194; Dole v.
Dow Chemical, 282 N.E.3d 288, 291 (N.Y. 1972). Dole was a landmark decision in that partial
indemnity was adopted though New York was not a comparative fault jurisdiction at the time
of the decision. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 597, 578 P.2d at 911, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
179. White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
180. American Can Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525,
21 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (1962).
181. White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
182. See, e.g., Angelus Associates v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532,
542, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 407 (1985); Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 543, 203
Cal. Rptr. 47, 50 (1984).
183. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d
at 543, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51; see E.L. White v. City of Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App.
3d 366, 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879, 885 (1982).
184. White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
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which protects a settling defendant from claims for partial indemnity, ' should thus afford the settling defendant no protection in cases
in which partial indemnity'8 6 does not have proper application.
A year after the decision in White, the court in Turcon v. Norton
Villiers, Ltd.,"' articulated instances in which a claim for total indemnity might be brought against a joint tortfeasor despite the existence of a good faith settlement between that joint tortfeasor and
the plaintiff. 8 8 In Turcon, the court denied the claim for total indemnity brought by the corporate owner of one vehicle involved in
an accident against the manufacturer of the other vehicle. 18 9 The
manufacturer had settled previously with the injured plaintiff. The
court based the denial of the claim on the absence of any allegation
that would provide a basis for shifting total liability. 190
The Turcon court did not deny the claim for indemnity on the basis
of a good faith settlement having been reached by the manufacturer
with the plaintiff.' 9 ' Nor did the court find that total indemnity had
been abolished by American Motorcycle.'9 2 Instead, the court was
unable to find the necessary circumstances present to allow total indemnity between the two defendants. 93
A year after Turcon, the court in Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co.,' ' also recognized that instances still exist in which total indemnity claims may be brought despite good faith settlement.' 95 In deciding
Torres, the court stated that section 877.6 does not have claims for

CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 877.6(b).
186. Id.
187. 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1983).
188. Turcon, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
189. Id.
190. Id. The implication of the decision, however, was that had the party claiming indemnity alleged that liability was imputed as a result of some relationship with the settling tortfeasor, from whom indemnity was sought, the claim for total indemnity might have been allowed.
Id.
191. Id. Though a settlement was reached, the court chose to base the holding on the absence
of factors necessary to shift total liability to one party. Further, the party seeking indemnity
admitted negligence, but contended that the negligent act occurred prior to the act of the defendant from whom indemnity was sought. The party sought total indemnity based on passive or
secondary negligence. American Motorcycle, however, effectively abandoned the primary versus secondary and active versus passive distinctions. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 579, 594, 578 P.2d 899, 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189. The court, in Turcon,
read the claim for total indemnity as a claim for partial indemnity based on the passive/secondary negligence admitted by the party seeking indemnity. Turcon, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 284,
188 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
195. Id. at 511 n.5, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 833 n.5.

185.
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total indemnity within its purview.' 96 Torres also rejected the interpretation of section 877.6 that barred claims for total indemnity against
a settling tortfeasor, based on the harsh effects that resulted.' 97 The
denial of the claim for total indemnity, however, was based on the
wrongful conduct alleged against the defendant asserting the claim.' 98
Though the court recognized that situations existed in which a defendant might properly bring a claim for total indemnity, the case before
the court was not an appropriate instance for this result.
Decided in the same year as Torres, Huizar v. Abex Corp.'99 held
that absent statutory authority to the contrary, justice demands that
total indemnity be available to a completely blamelesss party whose
liablity is premised solely upon the tortious act or omission of
another.2"' The court held that total indemnity is available in these
instances despite good faith settlement under section 877.6.201 In support of the decision, the Huizar court stressed that neither American
20 2
Motorcycle nor section 877.6 expressly abolished total indemnity.
Huizar reasoned that if the legislature intended to bar claims for total
indemnity under section 877.6, that intent would have been reflected
in the express language of the statute. 20 3 The court also concluded
that the intent of the supreme court in American Motorcycle to replace
total indemnity completely with partial indemnity would have been
expressed clearly.20 4 In further support of the decision, the Huizar
court noted the later supreme court decision in Safeway Stores v. NestKart, Inc.,205 which expressly left open the question of whether par-

196.

Id.

197. Id.
198. Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 511, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
In Torres an employee of Union Pacific was injured while using a jack owned by the company.
When the plaintiff sued Union Pacific and the manufacturer of the jack, Union Pacific cross-

complained against the manufacturer for indemnity. The court dismissed the cross-complaint

because the original complaint against Union Pacific alleged wrongful conduct in failing to

rehire the plaintiff. Id. The liability of Union Pacific was neither derivative nor vicarious, thus
precluding any right of total indemnity.
199.
200.
201.

156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984).
Id. at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 537. In Huizar, the plaintiff was injured while using a defective

punch press. He brought suit against the distributor and the manufacturer of the punch press
for damages incurred in his injuries. The distributor and the manufacturer cross-complained
against each other for indemnity. The manufacturer then settled with the plaintiff and the

distributor's cross-complaint for indemnity was dismissed. Id.
202. Id. at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
203. Id. See also City of Sacramento v. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 878, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 764, 769 (1982) (Paras, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. 156 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
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tial indemnity applied to situations in which the liability of a defend20 6
ant is vicarious.
In July 1985, the court in Angelus Associates v. Neonex Leisure
Products,2 7 again confronted the question of whether total indemnity survived a good faith settlement under section 877.6. In Angelus
the issue arose in a products liability action in which the manufacturer and retailer of a motorhome were joined as defendants after
the motorhome exploded and caused injury to the plaintiff.2 08 The
retailer brought a cross-complaint against the manufacturer for total
indemnity.20 9 When the manufacturer settled with the plaintiff, the
court granted the motion of the manufacturer for summary judgment
on the cross-complaint.2
In attempting to resolve the issue on appeal, the Angelus court initially recognized the suggestion in American Motorcycle that the goal
of apportioning liability according to fault should yield to the countervailing goal of pretrial settlement. 21 ' The court also realized the powerful incentive to settle provided by the release provisions in section
877.6.212 The court, however, emphasized that the language of section 877.6 expressly provided a release only from further claims for
partial indemnity based on comparative fault, and not from claims
for total indemnity. 2 '3 In light of these points, the court raised the
question of whether total indemnity existed after American Motorcycle, and if so, whether a total indemnity claim might be brought against
a tortfeasor who settles in good faith with the plaintiff under section
877.6.2

14

Furthermore, in framing the question on appeal, the court in Angelus
found that the facts of the case did not fit within the intended application of section 877.6.2 '5 The court first defined a "tortfeasor,"
as used in section 877.6, as a "wrongdoer ' 21 6 and suggested that a
retailer of a defectively manufactured product does not fit within this

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
-211.

Id.

167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985).
Id.
Id.
Id.
167 Cal. App. 3d at 537, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
212. Id. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6.
213. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 537, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 542, 213 Cal.. Rptr. at 407.
216. The court cites Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of tortfeasor. Id. at 5,12,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 407. Black's defines tortfeasor as "A wrongdoer; one who commits or is
guilty of a tort." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1661 (5th ed. 1979).
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definition. 2 7 Instead, in the context of a products liability action,
the liability of a retailer is imputed despite the lack of negligence
of the retailer.2"' Products liability, according to the court, is premised on the public policy of protecting the plaintiff even if a faultless
defendant is left to respond to the plaintiff in damages for the fault
of another. 2 9 The Angelus court, citing White, suggested that in the
absence of some type of actual wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, the principles of comparative fault, which provide a means of
apportioning wrong among "wrongdoers," cannot apply. 220 The court
then reasoned that the release provisions of section 877.6, themselves
based on apportionment principles, cannot act to bar claims for total
22
indemnity in cases when fault cannot properly be apportioned. '
Angelus also addressed the contention that allowing claims for total
indemnity despite a good faith settlement will produce a chilling effect, lessening the desirability of pretrial settlement. 222 The court conceded that the decision potentially might discourage settlements, but
concluded that this chilling effect would be proper in the limited circumstances in which it would occur.22 3 Presumably referring to situations similar to those in the case before the court, the opinion reasoned
that this chilling effect would act to deter those to whom fault is
solely attributable from "buying peace too cheaply ' 224 at the expense
of those defendants to whom liability might be imputed without
fault.22 The decision limits the policy of promoting settlement to situations in which no defendant who is innocent of wrongdoing is forced
by the settlement to bear the burden of the fault of another.
In summary, California appellate courts have split on the issue of
whether or not total indemnity is available against a tortfeasor who
settles with the plaintiff in good faith under section 877.6. Some courts
have held that American Motorcycle provided a system of indemnity
that has overtaken the prior system of total indemnity.2 26 These courts
also have found that the release provisions of section 877.6 act to
217. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 543, 213 Cal. Rptr.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Standard Pacific v. A.A. Baxter Corp.,
106, 111 (1986); Kohn, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 331,
App. 3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 766.

at 407.

at 408.

176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 587, 222 Cal. Rptr.
191 Cal. Rptr. at 80; Gemsch, 115 Cal.
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bar all claims for indemnity, partial or total.2 27 Other courts have
held that total indemnity is necessary in instances in which the liability of a defendant is vicarious or derivative. 228 These courts have also
found that section 877.6 does not act to release a settling defendant
from a claim for total indemnity. 229 The uncertainty felt by the defend-

ant whose liability is vicarious or derivative requires resolution of this
controversy to provide uniformity in this area of California law governing joint tortfeasors.
ANALYsIs OF THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW

As indicated by the cases faced with the issue of the continued
existence of total indemnity indicate, the controversy is essentially two-

pronged. First, the cases have questioned whether American Motorcycle replaced total indemnity with partial indemnity.230 Second, cases
have been faced with the issue of whether section 877.6 releases a
settling tortfeasor from further claims for total indemnity. 23' In analyzing the arguments for and against the continued existence of total
indemnity in California, the arguments focusing on the intent of the
California Supreme Court will be discussed separately from the
arguments focusing on the intent of the California Legislature.
A.

The Intent of the Supreme Court

The cases at the appellate level in California have disagreed on the
issue of whether or not the California Supreme Court intended to
replace total indemnity with partial indemnity.23 2 Although the supreme
court has not addressed this question directly, the position of the
supreme court can be drawn from the language of two opinions that

227. See Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113; Kohn, 142
Cal. App. 3d at 331, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
228. See Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409; Huizar, 156 Cal. App.
3d at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50; White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
229. See Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409; Torres, 157 Cal. App.
3d at 511, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 833; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
230. Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113; Angelus, 167
Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr.
at 50; Kohn, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83; White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at
375, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885; Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769; see
supra notes 122-229 and accompanying text.
231. Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113; Angelus, 167
Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409; Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 203 Cal. Rptr.
at 833; Lopez, 143, Cal. App. 3d at 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
232. Compare Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769 with Huizar, 156
Cal. App. 3d at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
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addressed the issue tangentially. These cases are the seminal case of
American Motorcycle, and the later case of Safeway Stores.
1.

The Language of American Motorcycle

Cases which have argued that American Motorcycle did replace total
indemnity with partial indemnity contend that though the California
Supreme Court never indicated expressly that intention in the opinion, the implication of American Motorcycle was that total indemnity no longer had a useful purpose in California.23 3 Instead, according
to this line of reasoning, indemnity in California was to be governed
by the partial indemnity in American Motorcycle.23" The cases that
argue that American Motorcycle replaced total indemnity with partial indemnity, however, do not have the support of the express
language of the supreme court. 231 The cases that support the continued existence of total indemnity focus on the language of American
Motorcycle and contend that at no point did the supreme court abolish
total indemnity.2 36 Instead, the court called for a modification of the
existing principles of indemnity to allow partial indemnity in "appropriate" instances.2 37 Though the court in American Motorcycle
recognized that total indemnity does not provide a fair result in a
"great majority ' 2 3 of cases, the court implied that total indemnity
does provide a just result in a minority of cases. This implication
is supported by the language of the supreme court in Safeway Stores.
2.

The Language of Safeway Stores

In addition to the express language of the court in American Motorcycle, the argument that total indemnity survives American Motorcycle is also supported by the express language of Safeway Stores v.
Nest-Kart, Inc.2 39 In that case, the supreme court expressly left open
the question of whether partial indemnity was to apply to cases in

233. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
234. Id.
235. Id. The court in Gemsch held that all indemnity except that governed by express contract was governed by American Motorcycle. The court also recognized that American Motorcycle did not expressly repudiate total indemnity, however. Id. at 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
236. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d
at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50; Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769 (Paras,

J., dissenting).
237. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 608, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201 (1978);
see supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
238. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 595, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
239. Safeway Stores, 21 Cal. 3d at 332, 579 P.2d at 447, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
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which the liability of a defendant was vicarious or derivative.24 0 This
language indicates that the supreme court is unwilling to apply partial indemnity expressly to all cases. If partial indemnity, as the
language of the court suggests, is not appropriate in all cases,
presumably the court retained total indemnity in cases that the court
intended to exclude from the scope of partial indemnity.
3.

The Intended Scope of PartialIndemnity

StandardPacific of San Diego v. A.A. Baxter, Corp. reasoned that
total indemnity was one end of a broad spectrum of indemnity
allowable under the partial indemnity adopted by American Motorcycle.2"' Thus, according to this argument, a separate doctrine of total
indemnity no longer was necessary after American Motorcycle. As
discussed earlier,2"2 this interpretation makes logical sense, no other
California court of appeal case has supported this interpretation. Further, the argument is weakened by the language of Safeway Stores,
which indicates that the supreme court is not ready to extend partial
indemnity to all cases, as Standard Pacific suggested.2" 3
The cases that have concluded that partial indemnity was not meant
to extend to cases in which the liability of a defendant is vicarious
or derivative have supported this conclusion with the language in
Safeway Stores.2" These cases have further indicated that in instances
of vicarious or derivative liability, the defendant has no wrong that
can be apportioned properly under comparative fault, and thus partial indemnity based on comparative fault cannot be applied. 245 This
argument makes sense, especially in light of the hesitancy of the
supreme court to extend partial indemnity to cases of vicarious or
derivative liability, in which the defendant is guilty of no fault.214
B.

The Intent of Section 877.6

Arguments for and against the continued existence of total indemnity based on the intended scope of section 877.6 generally have foc240. Id.
241. Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 587, 222 Cal. Rptr. at I11.
242. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
243. See Safeway Stores, 21 Cal. 3d at 332, 579 P.2d at 447, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555; see
also Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 587, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
244. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 537, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 405; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d
at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
245. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 407; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d
at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50; White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
246. Safeway Stores, 21 Cal. 3d at 332, 579 P.2d at 447, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
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used on three issues. First, the courts have questioned whether a
vicariously or derivatively liable defendant can be a "tortfeasor" within
the meaning of section 877.6. Second, one court has argued that total
indemnity is no longer needed since the good faith requirement for
settlements under section 877.6 adequately protects the interests of
the nonsettling defendant. Third, the courts have questioned whether
the continued existence of total indemnity would frustrate the incentive to settle which section 877.6 provides.
1. The Vicariously or Derivatively Liable Defendant as a
Tortfeasor Under Section 877.6
Section 877.6 bars those claims brought by "any tortfeasor" against
the settling tortfeasor. 4 7 Standard Pacific contended that the meaning of "joint tortfeasor" under section 877.6 includes those defendants whose liability is vicarious or derivative.2"" Angelus, however,
contended that a "tortfeasor" is a "wrongdoer," and that a defendant whose liablity is vicarious or derivative has done no wrong, and
is therefore not properly called a "tortfeasor." 2 9 Though historically
the term "joint tortfeasor" has been expanded, the term has not yet
25
been interpreted to include those who have not done any wrong.
An expansion to include blameless defendants would be contrary to
25
the meaning historically attached to the term "tortfeasor." ' Section
877.6, which bars claims brought by a tortfeasor against a settling
tortfeasor, should not apply to a defendant whose liability is vicarious
or derivative.
2.

The Requirement that the Settlement be in Good Faith

Standard Pacific also reasoned that defendants whose liability is
vicarious or derivative are adequately protected by the section 877.6
2 52
requirement that the settlement be in good faith. Though this argument is plausible, the practical effect is cast into doubt by Tech-Bilt
which placed the burden on the party asserting the lack of good
faith. 2 3 After Tech-Bilt, the defendant whose liability is vicarious or
247.
248.
249.

§ 877.6(c).
Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE

250. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
251. See Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 537, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
252. Standard Pacific, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
253. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499, 698 P.2d 159,
167, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263; see supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
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derivative must meet the "out of the ballpark" standard in order to
prove a lack of good faith.254 The subjectivity of this burden casts
doubt on whether the good faith requirement of section 877.6 provides any protection for the defendant whose liability is vicarious or
derivative. Thus, the vicariously or derivatively liable defendant should
be able to bring a claim for total indemnity despite the existence of
a "good faith" settlement.
3.

The Policy of Promoting Settlement

The cases that contend that section 877.6 should be construed to
bar a total indemnity claim against a settling tortfeasor, reason that
the policy of promoting settlement that underlies the statute, would
be defeated if total indemnity claims were allowed against a settling
tortfeasor. 2 " In practice, however, allowing claims for total indemnity despite the release provisions of section 877.6 would discourage
settlement only when two facts exist. 256 First, the party claiming a
right of indemnity must be factually faultless, as in the case of a
vicariously liable defendant. Only then will a right of total indemnity
even exist.1 7 Second, the party seeking to settle must be the tortfeasor upon whose fault the liability of the party seeking indemnity
is based. 258 Should one of these factors be absent, a party may settle
without fear of a subsequent claim for total indemnity. When both
factors are present, however, the party seeking settlement should not
be protected by the release provisions of section 877.6. If a settling
party is released from subsequent claims for total indemnity when
both factors are present, section 877.6 effectively encourages blameworthy defendants to escape liability at the expense of a blameless party. 25 9 Although section 877.6 was intended to promote settlements,
the statute should not be construed to promote settlement when that
construction would allow blameworthy defendants to escape liability
at the expense of those defendants whose liability is only vicarious
or derivative.
254. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
255. Lopez, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 193; see also Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.
3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. In Tech-Bill, the supreme court recognized
the goal of encouraging settlement implicit in § 877.6. Id.
256. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 36, § 51.
257. See American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 595, 578 P.2d at 909, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
American Motorcycle adopted a means of providing indemnity for the blameworthy defendant,
thus eliminating the need for total indemnity except in instances in which the defendant is
without fault. Id.
258. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 36, § 51.
259. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409; see supra notes 222-25 and
accompanying text.
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The cases which reason that section 877.6 does not bar claims for
total indemnity against a settling tortfeasor recognize the injustice that
60
would result if total indemnity claims were barred by the statute.1
These cases also focus on the express language of section 877.6, which
only provides a settling tortfeasor with a release from further claims

from partialindemnity. 26 ' The contention in these cases is that had
the legislature intended to provide a release from claims for total indemnity, that intent would have been expressed on the face of the
statute. 6 Since the policy of promoting settlement, which underlies

section 877.6, would work an injustice if extended to bar a total indemnity claim brought by a defendant whose liability is vicarious or
derivative, and the statute is explicit in providing a release from partial indemnity claims only, 6 3 section 877.6 should not be construed
to bar claims for total indemnity. Allowing claims for total indemnity despite section 877.6 will not frustrate the policy of promoting settlement in most cases. Instead, allowing total indemnity claims will

discourage those whose fault caused the injury to the plaintiff from
seeking to use the policy of promoting settlement as a means to escape
liablity at the expense of a faultless party.
CONCLUSION

Though neither American Motorcycle nor section 877.6 expressly
abandon the doctrine of total indemnity, the status of indemnity has

been a source of controversy in the lower courts. In the absence of
any express provisions repudiating the doctrine, however, and in light
of the decision in Safeway Stores to leave the question undecided

whether partial indemnity will apply to situations in which liability
is vicarious, total indemnity must remain available to vicariously or
derivatively liable defendants. Further total indemnity in these instances
should not be affected by the release provisions of 877.6. To con-

260. Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 830; Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d
at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409. The plaintiff may still go to trial against the nonsettling defendant and obtain an award reduced by the amount of the settlement. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 877. Should the nonsettling defendant be vicariously or derivatively liable, that defendant
will not have to bear the entire burden of the judgment, but still must bear some of the burden
caused by the fault of the settling party. Id.
261. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d
at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50; Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769 (Paras,
J., dissenting).
262. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409; Huizar, 156 Cal. App. 3d
at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50; Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 879, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
263. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 877.6(c).
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clude otherwise would be contrary to the Li fairness principle, to which
both the partial indemnity of American Motorcycle as well as 877.6
owe their existence.
Thomas P. Quinn, Jr.

